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I. INTRODUCTION 
The past twenty years have witnessed a rapid increase in the number 
of strikes taking place in the public sector of employment. In the year 
1962, President Kennedy signed into law Executive Order 10988, which made 
it legal for federal employees to collectively bargain over issues per-
taining to working conditions. The law did not allow bargaining over wage 
and salary issues. Many state and local governments soon followed with 
statutes of their own concerning this issue of public bargaining rights. 
Each state is unique in this respect as to the degree of bargaining and to 
what issues may legally be subject to the bargaining process. 
Public employee strikes are opposed on the grounds that they are 
threats to the public safety. This issue is not without its critics, who 
charge that strikes by certain professions, such as health care profession-
als, are threats to the public safety, regardless of whether these employ-
ees work for public or private agencies. The critics charge that it is the 
nature of the work that determines the threat to public safety, not whether 
the work is performed at a public or private entity (19, p. 184). The is-
sue of public sector strikes has become an increasingly important issue 
over the past two decades since it affects the average citizen directly 
at the most personal level: the corrmunity in which they live. 
Public strikes are unique in many respects when compared with strikes 
in the private sector. A public employer cannot close its doors and move 
to another region of the country with a more favorable economic or politi-
cal climate. An additional factor to consider is that public employee 
unions hold an advantageous position over private unions in that, when 
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negotiating settlements, public employees can attempt to influence the out-
come through political process as voters and lobbyists {19, p. 184). 
Many measures of determinants of strike activity in general do not 
apply to the public sector. Measures such as profits and productivity are 
either nonexistent or difficult to measure when considering the public sec-
tor separately. Work stoppages in the public sector are usually larger in 
magnitude than those in the private sector, since the former usually in-
volve larger employee units in metropolitan areas {32, p. 30). 
William Torrence {25) states that one reason for the growing nunber 
of strikes in the public sector is the relative inexperience of public of-
ficials in the area of collective bargaining. Since public sector strike 
activity is a relatively recent problem, it is thought that public offi-
cials are lacking experience in this area compared to their counterparts 
in the private sector, and this lack of experience contributes to con-
flicts that are not properly dealt with, leading to increased strike ac-
tivity . 
Joseph Krislov {11) found that the majority of strikes involving pub-
1 ic employees were concentrated among sanitation employees, utility employ-
ees, and educational employees. 
This study will focus on public school teacher strikes, which, as a 
group, are involved in more work stoppages than any other group of public 
employees {16, p. 131). Teachers are not only the largest single group of 
unionized public employees, but also hold the distinction of being the 
largest group of professionals which are unionized. 
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The present econo111Y is moving away from one which is industrially 
based, to an econo111Y in which service industries are gaining an increas-
ingly important role. As the industrial base of U.S. workers shrinks in 
proportion to that of other occupations, the unions which are dependent on 
industrial workers, such as the AFL-CIO, will be forced to look to the ser-
vice and public sectors of employment as new areas for potential organiza-
tion. Successful organization of public school teachers allows unions to 
make serious inroads into two areas which, for a long time, were nonunion: 
those of public and professional employees. 
Two major labor organizations represent teachers: the American Feder-
ation of Teachers (AFT), and the National Education Association (NEA). 
The NEA does not have national control over its members. State and local 
affiliates act independently with the NEA providing assistance only when 
specifically requested . The NEA is by far the largest teacher organization 
in the United States, representing approximately two-thirds of all public 
school employees, of which 85 percent are classroom teachers. 
The rival organization (AFT) has only about one-third the membership 
of the NEA, but has the AFL-CIO as its parent organization. The AFL-CIO 
has given its support to the AFT, since the successful organization of 
teachers may improve the image of unions in the eyes of other white collar 
employees. Although membership data concerning these organizations are not 
always available, it is believed that organizational rivalry between the 
AFT and the NEA may be a contributing factor to the increase in public 
school strike activity. 
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Teaching, as a profession, has lost much of its appeal in the past 
few decades. Budget considerations in local municipalities have forced 
school districts to economize in many areas, including wages of their em-
ployees. The product which teachers produce is not tangible and is, there-
fore, an easy target when considering cuts in a local budget. These budget 
cuts have resulted in increased classroom size and greater workloads for 
the teaching professional without a corresponding increase in salaries in 
relation to other groups of professional employees in our society (24, p. 
92). As a result, teachers in public school systems have become more 
alienated as an employee group; hence, the need for them to act collective-
ly to voice their concerns. 
The purpose of this study is to attempt to identify the major deter-
minants of strikes and work stoppages among public school teachers. Pre-
vious investigations concerning this topic have lead, for the most part, to 
unsatisfactory results. Either the specified variables were not consistent 
as to sign or the coefficients of these variables were not significant as 
determinants of teacher strikes and work stoppages. 
The present study will employ a combined cross-sectional and time-
series analysis which takes into account a variety of determinants of 
strike activity using data for each of the fifty states and the District 
of Colu!TDia over the period 1971-1980. The rationale for choosing this 
time frame is that it is the most recent period for which a full set of 
data can be obtained. 
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II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter will look into the general theory of strikes, why they 
take place, and examine some of the empir ical studies concerning these is-
sues. In order to determine why strikes take place, it is necessary to 
look at the theory of strikes and some empirical investigations as to the 
possible reasons for strikes and work stoppages . 
The nnst often-cited theory of strikes is that which is proposed by 
J . R. Hicks (8). Hicks' theory of strikes is based on the concept of 
"faulty negotiation" (8, p. 146). There is a divergence of expectations 
between what a firm offers and what the union offers in response. Neither 
offer is initially expected to be accepted by the other party, but there 
ex ists an equilibrium settlement which will satisfy both parties. However, 
if this equilibrium is not met, a strike will result, since the parties 
have failed to come to terms. 
An employer may lose profits during a wage conflict from either of 
two alternatives . The employer may grant a real wage settlement that is 
higher than the previous real wage received by the workers. This will low-
er profits if worker productivity does not increase by more than the real 
wage increase, assuming that product price and demand remain constant. Al-
ternatively, the employer may refuse the proposed increase in the real 
wage, incur a possible strike, and lose profits from the work stoppage that 
would have been realized if the strike had not taken place. Similarly, an 
employee must weigh the consequences of striking and receiving no pay with 
the hope that the final settlement will make up for this loss, or the em-
ployee may accept an initial wage offer which is less than what was 
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expected. Both the employer and empl oyee must weigh the opportunity cost 
of their decisions, including the possibil i ty of job l oss for the worker 
and bankruptcy for the firm (see Figure 2-1). 
Wage 
rate 
0 
Union's resistance curve 
p 
Employer's 
concession 
curve 
Expected length of strike 
Figure 2-1. Hicks' strike model 
The segment OZ is the wage an employer would pay if not constrained by 
the union . At time zero, there is a divergence in expectations between 
the two parties. As time progresses, an employer may be willing to grant a 
higher wage because the opportunity cost of doing so is less than the cost 
of a continued work stoppage. The union's expectations decrease over time 
as the opportunity cost of a continued work stoppage outweighs the 
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potential increase in wages that may result from continuing the strike. 
Therefore, the strike acts as a mechanism to bring the two parties into 
agreement, resulting in a wage OA only after a period of time OP which is 
necessary in order to force the two parties into agreement. Because of 
faulty negotiations at the initial stages, the strike acts as a device 
through which an equilibrium can be reached. This equilibrium will ·vary 
with the relative opportunity costs of the two parties involved. The 
union's resistance curve will depend on a nullDer of factors, such as the 
size of the strike fund, savings of members, and the attitude of others 
not involved. The employer's concession curve depends on the relative 
cost of concession and resistance (8, p. 154). During strong economic 
periods of high employment, the employer's resistance is not as strong, 
since the opportunity cost of holding out is higher because of lost reve-
nues from not producing. 
Orley Ashenfelter and George Johnson (1) expand on Hicks' basic theory 
by adding a third party to the negotiating process. They state that union 
leadership objectives are accomplished by satisfying their rank and file 
members. Therefore, three parties are involved in the process: manage-
ment, union leadership, and rank and file union members. Ashenfelter and 
Johnson state that a breakdown in negotiations can only occur when the 
parties involved are irrational in their expectations. If a given wage 
offer is less than what is expected by the rank and file, the union leader-
ship has two options. It can sign a lesser agreement which causes hard 
feelings among the rank and file, or it can strike. The strike is the pre-
ferred mechanism, since it appears to the rank and file as though the 
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union is fighting on their behalf. A strike may be needed in order for 
the rank and file menbership to realize that their initial expectations 
were not rational (1, p. 37). That is, the union leadership and management 
may have rational expectations concerning the negotiations, but fail to 
reach agreement because the union leadership must attempt to satisfy the 
rank and file whose expectations are irrational. Therefore, the strike 
acts to force the rank and file membership to face reality. The analysis 
of strikes is similar to the assessment made by Hicks (8). Over time, the 
rank and file are forced by economic necessity to lower their expectations 
concerning a final settlement. Only by the act of striking, and thereby 
losing their present income, will the rank and file face the reality of 
the situation. 
Ashenfelter and Johnson also looked at the possible determinants that 
affect whether or not the parties will reach agreement. These factors are 
broken down into objective and subjective categories. Elasticity of labor 
demand, state of product demand, and the capital-labor ratio are objective 
factors which will influence the bargaining position of the firm (1, p. 
36). If a firm faces an inelastic demand for labor, it is nx>re likely to 
be willing to pay a higher wage, since it may not be able to substitute 
other workers or equipment in the vacated positions. If the demand for 
the product produced by the firm is at a low point, the firm may be willing 
to resist the union, since there is not sufficient incentive for the em-
ployer to settle. The capital-labor ratio also affects the willingness of 
management to settle, since firms with high ratios may be able to substitute 
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supervisory workers for short periods of time and, thereby, continue op-
erations. Subjective factors include the assessment of bargaining strate-
gy and the attitudes toward the risk of striking by both union and manage-
ment. 
Additional results from Ashenfelter and Johnson suggest that strike 
activity is a function of a moving average of the real wage received by 
workers. That is, an increase in real wages was found to lead to a re-
duction in strike activity. The timing of contract expirations alters 
the effect of real wages as determinants of strike activity in any given 
year. At times, the increase in real wages offered by employers may be 
greater than what the rank and file members expect. At other times, the 
employer's offer of an increase in real wages may be below rank and file 
expectations. Therefore, use of a lagged wage model which incorporates 
the change in real wages over a two-year period is thought to be a more 
reliable measure of the true effect of a change in real wages on the 
level of strike activity than using a single period real wage change. 
Contract expirations were also found to be determinants of seasonal 
strike activity. Trade unions try to gear their contract expirations 
to times of the year when demand for their services is high and avoid ex-
pirations when demand is low. This helps explain why spring and sunrner 
seasons experience more strike activity than do fall and winter (1, p. 42). 
Daniel Mitchell (14) also stresses the importance of contract ex-
pirations on the level of strike activity. Two important variables are 
associated with contract expirations. One deals with the relationship 
between a worker's past wage increase compared to others in that industry. 
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The other variable measures the amount of real wage increase regardless 
of what other firms are paying (14, p. 124) . Although the two variables 
are highly correlated, the results of this study indicate a negative re-
lationship between strike activity and a real or relative wage gain by em-
ployees. The positive relationship between the number of strikes and the 
number of contract expirations can be used to explain the tendency for 
employers to negotiate multi-year agreements in order to reduce the fre-
quency of costly work stoppages (14, p. 126). 
Another study investigating the relationship of contract expirations 
and strike activity was conducted by Sean Flaherty (7). This study fo-
cused on a relatively recent time period from 1961 to 1981, and found re-
sults that were in agreement with those found by Mitchell {14). Flaherty's 
(7) findings were even more dramatic, since he found that approximately 
two-thirds of strike activity was related to contract expiration. More 
important was the difference in the determinants of strike activity when 
considering contract renegotiation strikes and intracontractual strikes 
separately. Eighty-five percent of renegotiation strikes were fought over 
economic issues, but only 10 percent of intracontractual strikes involved 
economic issues. In addition, the average duration of the strike was 15 
days when renegotiating the contract, while duration was less than 3 days 
during intracontractual disputes (7, p. 20). Another finding of the 
study was that the unemployment rate had a significant effect on contract 
expiration strikes but had little effect on intracontractual strikes. 
Since intracontractual strikes are short in duration, it seems logical 
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that they would not be affected by the availability of part-time work or 
the size of the strike fund (7, p. 23}. 
A study by Albert Rees (18} relating strike activity to the business 
cycle found that the primary cause of cyclical strike movement is due to a 
change in the propensity of workers to strike (18, p. 380}. The condi-
tion of the labor market with respect to the amount of unemployment was 
found to exhibit a high degree of correlation to the business cycle. 
Therefore, during high periods of unemployment the business cycle would 
be at a low point and, likewise, the propensity of workers to strike would 
also be low. A rising level of employment offers unions the opportunity 
to exert additional pressure on the firm. Employers are reluctant to lose 
their relative position in an expanding market and will be more agreeable 
to the union's terms. Another factor to consider when employment is ris-
ing is that employees will have alternatives in the job market which less-
ens the ability of an employer to replace a worker which, in turn, lowers 
the employer's resistance toward the union's demands (18, p. 381). Rees 
(18) concludes that strike activity closely follows the level of eJl1)loy-
ment in the economy, but that eliminating cyclical variations in t~e bus1-
ness cycle will not eliminate strikes. Eliminating cyclical variations 
will diminish the importance of the relationship between strike activity 
and the unemployment rate, thereby increasing the importance of other de-
terminants, resulting in a smoother trend of strike activity over time. 
A study by David Britt and Omer Galle (2) illustrates the relationship 
between industry size and the frequency of strikes. Results of this study 
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show that strikes are positively related to size of the industry, but that 
the breadth of the work stoppage bears no relationship to industry size (2, 
p. 648). Unionization was found to be an important determinant of the na-
ture of the strike. With unions present, the strikes tend to be more fre-
quent, involve a greater nurrber of workers, and are shorter in duration 
than strikes by nonunion workers. Industrial organizations are so large 
that the incentives for individual strike action are at a minimum. Collec-
tive action is an effective method to overcome this difficulty and this 
is the purpose for which unions serve. The size of the union does not 
change the nature of the conflict, but does affect the frequency with which 
strikes will occur (2, pp. 650-651). 
A similar study concerning the effects of industries of differing 
sizes and production methods was conducted by Frederick Eisele (6). This 
study used an additional variable that relates the production method or 
manufacturing technique to the level of strike activity. Results indicate 
that industries which use a production line method have more frequent 
strike activity than industries using other production technqiues when in-
dustry size is held constant (6, p. 561). Although Eisele's (6) results 
are roughly in accord with Britt and Galle (2), a note of caution must be 
pointed out. That is, when an industry grows in size, changes in the make-
up of the organization take place which may change the original dimensions 
of the firm. This may cause one to make faulty cause and effect conclusions 
regarding the relationship between size or method of production with fre-
quency of strikes. There appeared to be a large variation in the groups, 
suggesting that many plants seem to be more strike-prone regardless of the 
size or method of production (6, p. 571). 
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Bruce Kaufman (9) looks at the interindustry differences in the level 
of strike activity and finds that a large portion of total strike activity 
can be attributed to a small number of industries. Mining, though small as 
a percentage of the workforce, makes up a large portion of strike activi-
ty. In contrast, public employees represent a large percentage of union 
ment>ers but exhibit a small percentage of total strikes (9, p. 48) . Find-
ings suggest that durable good industries react to changes in the rate of 
inflation with lll)re frequent strike action than do industries producing 
nondurable goods. However, all industries exhibit positive and significant 
relationships when comparing strike activity with independent variables, 
such as inflation or the rate of unemployment (9, pp. 50-51). This find-
ing is in agreement with previous studies done on the industry level but 
extends the relationship to all ind~stries. No single pattern of secular 
trends in strike activ i ty was found to exist when considering only infla-
tion or the unemployment rate. This suggests that other factors, such as 
industry relocation, foreign competition, or changing laws affecting spe-
cific industries, may be more influencial in predicting strike activity in 
an interindustry study (9, p. 56). 
Robert Mclean (13) also investigated interindustry differences in 
strike activity for the United States in general. This study found that 
wage demands were not significantly related to the relative wage position 
in an industry. This finding is not in agreement with other studies on 
this relationship and caution should be exercised when considering the 
relative wage position as an independent variable to predict strike activi-
ty. However, results did support the hypothesis that workers that received 
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high wages in the past expect high wages in future contracts (13, p. 106). 
A somewhat surprising result was that productivity had little influence on 
the level of strike activity, although productivity may have been previous-
ly incorporated in management's initial wage offer (13, p. 106). Southern 
industries were found to be important determinants of increased strike ac-
tivity. This finding runs counter to what would be expected, but may be 
explained by the fact that many industries that have relocated in the 
South may be relocating because of industrial disputes previously en-
countered in northern states. That is, these southern industries are simp-
ly bringing their labor problems along with them when they relocate in the 
South. The final result of this study confirmed the hypothesis that indus-
tries whose work force consists of a large percentage of female elllJloyees 
are less likely to experience strike activity (13, p. 108). 
Bruce Kaufman (10) states that factors other than purely economic are 
needed as determinants of strike activity. Psychological factors, such as 
militance of workers, style of union leadership, and public opinion towards 
unions are all important determinants (10, p. 483). A problem with using 
psychological factors is that it is not clear how one would empirically 
measure such factors. Kaufman does not attempt to measure these factors, 
but simply states that they account for a portion of the variability in 
strike determination models. Kaufman did examine the effect of interunion 
rivalry on the propensity to strike. This rivalry increases the nunber of 
strikes for two reasons. Union leaders who face rivalry from other unions 
rrust demonstrate to the rank and file that their union is the better one. 
The effort put forth in both organizaing and bargaining is related to the 
amount of competition they face from rival unions. Another reason 
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is the increased number of jurisdictional disputes, meaning that the union 
leaders pursue new members and better contracts than they would in the ab-
sence of the rivalry. This results in more strikes (10, p. 484). Kaufman 
found no effect between the political party in office and the degree of 
strike activity in the postwar period. In the post World War II period, 
the level of organization and the legal system regarding employee rights 
have remained relatively stable. Thus, according to Kaufman, economic fac-
tors remain as the strongest influence on strike activity (10, p. 489). 
Arie Shirom (20) examines the premise that management bargaining strat-
egies associated with perception of an advantageous outcome of a strike 
will influence management's behavior in future labor conflicts. An impor-
tant indicator of a union's power is the ability to disrupt the operation 
of the firm. On the other hand, the ability of management to continue op-
erations during a work stoppage is an indication of their power. The em-
phasis is on management's point of view, since it is believed that unions 
react to the policies and practices of management (20, p. 46). Interviews 
with the employer's chief negotiator for the fifty-one strikes studied in 
this investigation found that the majority of the strike settlements fa-
vored management. An operative strategy was employed in approximately two-
thirds of the cases with the struck plants actually operating in about 
one-third of the situations (20, p. 49). The operating strategy, assumed 
to predict management's perceived advantage, predicted a significant frac-
tion of the settlements that were advantageous toward the management side 
of the conflict. 
Neil Snarr (21) found that certain characteristics were nx>re likely to 
be found among workers who strike. High pay, high skill level, being male, 
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and being married were all found to be characteristics that were related to 
strike activity. Age and seniority were not found to be significant as 
determinants of strike activity . Strike activity was found to be positive-
ly related to having children and having a nonworking spouse. This study 
tends to indicate that active union menbers have more at stake in their job 
situation than do inactive union merrbers (21, p. 374) . 
Joseph Krislov (11) examined public sector strike activity and found 
that workers who formed a homogeneous group and were somehwat isolated from 
other work groups had a higher propensity to strike (11, p. 90). Although 
Kr islov maintains that the majority of public sector strikes occur over 
economic issues, he does investigate other determinants of strike activity. 
Krislov observed that states enacting no-strike laws for their public em-
ployees experience a decline in the nurrber of strikes after enactment of 
the statute, but that some states without these laws also experienced a de-
cline in strike activity. Therefore, the exact effect of these no-strike 
laws could not be determined. 
James Young and Betty Brewer (33) continued the research of Krislov 
(11), but came to different conclusions. Economic issues accounted for 55 
percent of strike activity, with approximately one-third of the strikes re-
sulting from bargaining impasses (33, p. 360). 
William J. Moore (15) examined the effect of right-to-work legislation 
on the level of strike activity. Moore states that it is incorrect to as-
sume that the passage of right-to-work laws weakens membership or bargain-
ing power of unions because right-to-work legislation may simply be a re-
flection of strong anti-union attitudes of a given state. Therefore, a 
negative correlation between strike activity and right-to-work laws may 
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reflect strong anti-union attitudes of a given state rather than any strike 
deterring aspects of the law itself. Moore tests for the possibility of a 
simultaneous equation bias on the right-to-work variable and finds that, 
when using a two-stage least squares procedure, the negative coefficient on 
the right-to-work variable is drastically reduced, thereby confirming 
Moore's hypothesis. 
Public attitudes toward striking public employees will also have an 
effect on the number of strikes, since it is thought that local attitudes 
influence the public employee's strike propensity as a contributing en-
vironmental factor (12). 
John Burton and Charles Krider (3) conducted an extensive study into 
the determinants of strike activity in the public sector. Three factors 
were thought to be involved in determining the incidence of strikes in a 
given state: the state environment including both economic and political 
factors; the extent of private sector unionization; and the statutory poli-
cy of the state (3, p. 155). 
These factors were used as a general framework for developing a series 
of independent variables thought to be important as determinants of strike 
activity. The results of this study were not very conclusive. Correlation 
coefficients changed sign when comparing one year with another, leading to 
problems in interpreting results. In addition, many of the independent 
variables used in the study were not found to be significant determinants 
of strike activity . Public policy variables were inconsistent determinants 
of strike activity, but should not be totally discounted in future studies, 
since many of the policy variables were relatively recent in their 
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enactment and may not have been in effect long enough to affect strike ac-
tivity (23, p. 178). 
Previous studies in the area of determinants of public work stoppages, 
both in general and for teachers, have led to many contradictory results. 
This study , which will concentrate on public teacher work stoppages, will 
seek to overcome the deficiencies of prior investigations in an attempt to 
improve measures concerning the determinants of public teacher strike ac-
tivity. Since previous studies had been done during periods of changing 
policies concerning public employee bargaining rights, it is thought that 
using data from the period 1972 to 1980 will result in ilfl)roved findings, 
since sufficient time has passed to stabilize policy events enacted in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. However, the absence of data prevents the 
study of the dynamics of the change in strike activity which occurred from 
the early 1960s to the period of this study. 
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III. MODEL FORMULATION 
This chapter will be used to formulate a 1TX>del which will attempt to 
identify the major determinants of strikes and work stoppages involving 
public school teachers. The investigation will focus on a nine-year period 
covering the years 1972 through 1980, using cross-sectional data which in-
clude observations from all fifty states and the District of Columbia. The 
study is limited to this time period because of problems with the data in 
years prior to 1972 and the absence of publicly available data after the 
year 1980. 1 This chapter will include three sections: Section A will dis-
cuss the dependent variables; Section B will focus on the independent vari-
ables considered to be an important influence in public school teacher 
strike activity; and Section C will be used to forlll.llate a model of strike 
activity involving public school teachers. 
A. Dependent Variables 
The purpose of this model is to attempt to determine the number of 
public sector teacher strikes which will take place in a given year. The 
emphasis of this investigation is on the nunt>er of strikes. However, it 
may be useful to also examine some alternative measures of strike activity. 
A second measure of strike activity is the breadth of the strike as mea-
sured by the number of workers involved in the strike. A third measure is 
the duration of the strike-- that is, a dependent variable designed to cap-
ture the number of days which workers are idle as a result of the work 
1 Data, broken down by state, on the level of strike activity of pub-
1 ic school teachers are not available for years prior to 1972. 
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stoppage. Each of these variables are important as measures of the overall 
impact of a strike. Since this investigation is concerned only with 
strikes involving public school teachers, all measures used in this inves-
tigation regarding teacher based variables pertain to public school teach-
ers only. The data source used for the dependent variables selected in 
this study was "Work Stoppages in Government," published by the U.S. De-
partment of Labor (30). Three dependent variables will be used to measure 
the level of public teacher strike activity. 
1. Number of stoppages 
A strike is defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics as a temporary 
stoppage of work by a group of employees to express a grievance or enforce 
a demand. All stoppages, whether or not authorized by the union, legal or 
illegal are counted providing that the stoppage lasts at least one full day 
or shift and involves at least six full-time employees. 
2. Number of workers involved 
This variable was selected as a measure of the magnitude of the work 
stoppage. Its inclusion as a dependent variable is an attempt to differ-
entiate between relatively major and minor work stoppages in a given state 
or district. A state which experiences many teacher strikes may bias the 
results of this study if the magnitude of these strikes is small relative 
to states which experience small numbers of work stoppages, but involve 
several thousand employees. The figure used for the nurrber of public 
school teachers i~volved in a strike is the maximum nurrber actually made 
idle in the establishment or establishments directly involved. No dis-
tinction is made between the active participants in the strike and those 
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unable to work because of the strike activity. Therefore, the inclusion of 
this variable will measure the number of full-time public school teachers 
prevented from working because of a strike action during a given calendar 
year. 
3. Work-days idle 
This measure is used as an indication of the duration of the work 
stoppage. As such, it has a direct correlation to the other dependent 
variables used in the model since the value of this variable is calculated 
as follows: workers involved multiplied by workdays lost per worker equal 
total days idle. A work-day is defined as a full-time worker's daily peri-
od of employment. The number of work-days idle is also measured as those 
occurring in a given calendar year. 
These dependent variables will be used in two forms of numerical 
values. One form will use the absolute value for each state or district. 
In this case, the number of public teachers in the state is controlled for 
on the right side of the equation. The other form will transform the 
dependent variables to 11 per teacher" measures by dividing the dependent 
variables by the number of public school teachers in each state. This 
normalized approach will hopefully eliminate the distortions which may be 
caused by population differences among the states and districts. This 
procedure transforms each of the dependent variables by means of trans-
forming them into "per worker" units of measurement. 
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B. Independent Variables 
Previous investigations of public strike activity have revealed that 
no single category of variables, such as economic or legal, are capable of 
determining strike activity. Therefore, a broad spectrum of possible 
strike determinants will be employed in this study. Four general cate-
gories of determinants are believed to affect the workplace with regard to 
the propensity of strike activity. 
The degree of unionization in a given state is believed to have an im-
pact on the workforce of a state, since it may be an indication of the 
population's attitude toward organized labor. In measuring the degree of 
unionization for a particular state, one must take into account the general 
climate towards unions. Since this study is directed at public school 
teachers, a measure of their tendency to form collective bargaining units 
lll.lst also be considered. 
Public sector legislation may affect the degree of strike activity in 
a given state, both directly, through prohibiting strikes, and indirectly, 
by means of legislation regarding bargaining rights of public employees. 
Therefore, measures concerning a state's legal environment with regard to 
public employee bargaining must also be considered . 
Economic factors, both in general terms and specifically related to 
public school teachers, must also be taken into account. Factors, such as 
the rate of inflation or the rate of unemployment in a given state, are 
thought to be useful as an indication of a worker's propensity to strike in 
any given year. Consideration must also be given to factors which affect 
the public teacher's economic environment, such as the expenditures per 
pupil made in a state's public school system. An additional factor may be 
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the change in the real wage of public teachers, since it affects their rel-
ative standard of living when compared with others in the workforce. 
One must also examine the demographic characteristics and teaching 
environment in a given state as an indication of the environment in which 
the given teacher operates. Factors such as the percentage of a state's 
population which is urbanized may be an indication of a worker's propensi-
ty to strike. In addition, factors such as the percentage of teachers in a 
gi ven state who are female may affect strike propensity. The following 
variables were considered as primary determinants of public school teacher 
strike activity. These selected variables were categorized into four basic 
groups on the basis of theoretical causality. 
1. Unionization 
The degree of unionization in a given state is thought to be a sig-
nificant determinant of the number of strikes which occur. A work group 
will be more inclined to strike if the group is unionized. The degree of 
unionization will also serve as a proxy for a state's general attitude to-
ward unions. A state with a high percentage of its workforce unionized is 
thought to be more tolerant of unions and the strike mechanism as a method 
of voicing grievances than a state with a relatively low percentage of its 
workforce unionized. Variables thought to have an impact on the degree of 
unionization in a given state were further broken down into two categories. 
a. General climate Variables considered in this category are 
those thought to reflect a state's overall attitude toward unions. 
i) Percent of nonagricultural/nongovernment employees unionized 
(NONAG) This measure is considered to be a proxy which identifies those 
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states whose public attitude toward unionization is a positive one. It 
is thought that those states having a higher percentage of their workforce 
unionized will likewise experience ITX)re strike activity. This variable 
will also serve as a proxy for tastes of the workers with regard to unions 
and the degree of worker militancy in a given state. Both of these would 
be expected to increase with the percentage of union members in the state. 
Data for this variable were collected from the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States (27) and includes both public and private union membership. 
Data were available only for even years; odd years were linearly interpo-
lated . 
ii) Right-to-work (RTTOWK) The basic premise of right-to-
work legislation is that no person may be denied, or excluded from, employ-
ment because of membership or nonmembership in a labor organization. 
Right-to-work laws are enacted on an individualized basis by each state. 
As of 1980, no major industrialized state had a right-to-work law in ef-
fect. Of the twenty states which have right-to-work laws in effect, nine-
teen were enacted during the late 1940s to early 1950s. Since that time, 
the situation has remained fairly stable, with Louisiana's 1976 enactment 
being the exception (4, p. 178). Right-to-work laws are thought to be in-
dicative of a negative public attitude toward labor unions. Therefore, one 
would expect this negative attitude toward unions to carry over to a nega-
tive attitude toward strikes in general. As a result, one could expect a 
decrease in the frequency of strike activity for those states having 
right-to-work laws (see Table 3-1). These data will be measured by means of 
a du1Tl111Y variable (dunmy = 1) entered for each state which has a right-to-
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work law in existence. The data source for this variable was the "Sunmary 
of State Policy Regulations for Public Sector Labor Relations" (31). 
b) Teacher specific Two organizations are involved in the unioni-
zation of public school teachers. They are the NEA (National Education 
Association) and the AFT (American Federation of Teachers). Together, 
these organizations represent the majority of all public school teachers 
who are members of labor organizations. The NEA represents approximately 
85 percent of all classroom teachers and far exceeds the number of teach-
ers represented by its rival organization, the AFT. Unfortunately, this 
rivalry cannot be further examined, since the AFT, which is associated with 
the AFL-CIO, does not publicly reveal its membership on a state-by-state 
basis. Therefore, the NEA merrbership data will be used as a proxy for pub-
1 ic school teacher unionization. 
i) Number of NEA merrbers (NEAMEM) This variable measures the 
absolute number of NEA merrbers in each state or district. Since this mea-
sure is being used as a proxy for teacher attitudes toward unionization, it 
would be expected that, as NEA membership increases, the number of strikes 
would also increase. This variable will also be used as a per teacher mea-
sure; dividing each observation by the nurrber of public school teachers in 
each state. Data for the measure were collected for each state for each 
year pertaining to this study from the NEA Handbook (17). Upon examina-
tion of this data, a measurement problem became apparent. That is, many 
states exhibited huge increases in membership in specific years. Further 
examination revealed that many of these large increases were due to 
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unification. 2 After identifying the states and years in which unification 
took place, an adjustment was made in an attempt to remove the unification 
bia s . The adjustment method was based on using the one year change after 
unification to project back to the year before unification took place. 
After this adjustment was made, the prevailing yearly percentage changes 
were used in adjusting the data back to 1972. 
2. Public sector legislation 
This group of variables is included in order to control for a state's 
legal environment. This category will also examine the limitations which 
a state may impose on the resolution of bargaining disputes as evidenced 
by 11 no strike" provisions enacted by a given state's statute covering pub-
lie employees. The vast majority of laws covering bargaining in the public 
sector were enacted during the late 1960s to early 1970s (see Table 3-1). 
Prior investigations into the area of public employee work stoppages found 
that legal determinants were, for the most part, not significant as deter-
minants of public employee work stoppages. These prior studies were com-
pleted during the early 1970s. This may have been too early to allow the 
changes in state laws to be a factor which influences public work stop-
pages. Data collected for this category included legislation pertaining to 
public education labor laws in specific states. Where no public education 
statutes are in effect, the state's general public sector labor laws were 
used. The legal variables considered in this category were all measured 
2 Unification refers to the individual local NEA organizations becoming 
members of the national NEA organization. Before unification, local NEA 
chapter membership data was not reported unless the local chapter was a 
member of the national organization. 
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as duntny variables (durrmy = 1) for the years that the law or statute is 
in effect. The data source used in compiling these measures was the Sum-
mary of State Policy Regulations for Public Sector Labor Relations ( 31). 
a. Mutual duty to bargain (MDUTY) This variable identifies those 
states which have a mutual duty statute which requires both employees and 
employers to meet and confer over issues pertaining to the workplace. 
States which have mutual duty statutes should experience fewer stoppages, 
since the parties involved are forced by law to bargain. This statute 
should reduce strikes, since both sides will have an opportunity to air 
their grievances and attempt to reconcile their differences before a work 
stoppage occurs. An alternative hypothesis is that the presence of a mu-
tual duty statute may be interpreted by the workforce as the right to go 
to an impasse in the bargaining process. If this interpretation is cor-
rect, the presence of a rTl.Jtual duty statute may actually lead to an in-
crease in strike activity. 
b. Strikes prohibited (NOSTRK) The majority of states prohibit 
strikes by their public sector employees. However, not all of these states 
have statutes which specify what punishment, if any, a public employee on 
strike would receive. Prohibiting strikes without a stated penalty sug-
gests that the laws are likely to be ignored. A preliminary investigation 
revealed no major difference in using only "prohibited with penalty" mea-
sures when compared with the broader "no strike" measure. Therefore, only 
the no strike measure was employed in this study, since it is a broader 
measure and thought to best capture the intent of the law. One would ex-
pect a decrease in public school teacher strike activity in states which 
expressly prohibit public sector strikes. 
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3. Economic factors 
This group includes variables which affect the individual employee 
as an economic entity of society. Public school teachers, as well as 
others in our society, are greatly influenced by the economic environment 
in which we live. Economic fluctuations which cause changes in the level 
of unemployment or changes in the price level are thought to be major 
causes of employee unrest, since these factors affect the attitudes and 
perceptions of the individual relative to the society in which he or she 
lives. The following variables have been selected as being primarily eco-
nomic in nature and have been further categorized as being either general 
economic factors or teacher specific economic factors. 
a. General economic factors This group will include those fac-
tors thought to influence the general populace with regards to the pro-
pensity to strike in response to a changing economic environment. The 
change in the cost of living measured by means of the CPI (1967=100) will 
not be used as a separate determinant. Instead, all dollar-based variables 
will be standardized so that all are measured in real terms, thereby mini-
mizing the inflationary bias. 
i. Unemployment rate (UNEM) The level of unemployment in 
each state influences the bargaining power of the individual employee. 
During periods of relatively high unemployment, the bargaining position of 
the worker is seriously hampered, since the employers in that state have a 
larger pool of workers and, in some cases, need not be concerned with work-
er unrest. Attractive alternatives to present employment may not be avail-
able to the worker in question. There also exists a larger pool of 
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potential replacement workers should a work stoppage occur. Both of these 
factors should result in less strike activity during periods of high unem-
ployment. An alternative hypothesis, relevant to the cross-section, may be 
that the level of strike activity is positively related to the level of un-
employment. This situation may occur because of a possible cause and ef-
fect problem. That is, since most strike activity takes place in the more 
industrialized areas and, since industrial areas typically experience high-
er levels of unemployment, it may be that a higher rate of unemployment is 
associated with increased strike activity. Data related to the state's 
yearly unemployment rate were obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States (27). 
b. Teacher specific economic factors This group will include 
those economic factors thought to be related to the level of strike ac-
tivity in the teaching profession. 
i) Expenditure per pupil (EXPPUP) It is thought that a state 
which contributes a large expenditure per pupil has a positive attitude to-
ward education and will, therefore, provide better salaries and teaching 
environments than those states with low expenditures per pupil. If this 
hypothesis is correct, one would expect strike activity in the teaching 
profession to be negatively related to the state's expenditure per pupil. 
An alternative hypothesis is based upon the assumption that high expendi-
tures per pupil are associated with states having a higher per capita in-
come, such as those found in states with a more urbanized population. If 
this hypothesis is correct, one would assume higher expenditures per pupil 
to be positively related to the more frequent strike activity which is 
typical in the more industrialized states. This variable will be 
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transformed into real terms by means of the CPI to correct for any infla-
tionary bias. The data source used in the collection of this measure was 
the Digest of Educational Statistics (29). The measure for the year 1980 was 
linearly extrapolated, since the data were not yet publicly available. 
ii) Lagged wages (LAG2) Teacher wages are a major theoreti-
cal cause of strike actions . As the price level increases without a cor-
responding increase in nominal wages, the real wage declines. This ero-
sion of real wages is hypothesized to be a major cause of teacher strikes. 
However, as Ashenfelter and Johnson (1) point out, the relationship between 
the real wage and strike activity is rrMJre than a single year relationship. 
Since contract expirations may not occur on an annual basis, it is thought 
that a two period lagged wage rrMJdel would be a rrMJre reasonable approach 
to use when considering the effect that real wages have on the level of 
strike activity. The following lagged wage rrMJdel, used by Ashenfelter and 
Johnson (1), is presented below. 
where: 
v1 = Percentage change in nominal wages for the first period lag 
nominal waget - nominal waget-l 
nominal waget-l ; 
Y2 = Percentage change in nominal wages for the second period lag 
nominal waget-l - nominal waget_2 
nomina 1 waget_2 
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x1 = Percentage change in the CPI for the first period lag 
CPit - CPit-l 
CPit-l 
x
2 
= Percentage change in the CPI for the second period lag 
CPit-l - CPit_2 
CPit_2 
This model specifies a one-year and two-year change in the real wage with 
each year having an equal weight as to the total effect. Data pertaining 
to this measure were compiled from the Statistics of Public Elementary and 
Secondary Day Schools (28). The measure for the year 1980 was l inearly 
extrapolated since the data was not yet publicly available. 
4. Demographic and teaching environment 
This group of variables is thought to reflect the environment in which 
a teacher must work in a given state. The following variables are thought 
to be an indication of the working conditions and demographic characteris-
tics of the state in which the teacher is employed . Most of these teach-
ing environment variables were found to have little or no effect on public 
teacher strike activity (see Appendix A) . However, the following variables 
were selected as possible determinants. 
a. Percent SMSA (PCTSMSA) A SMSA (standard metropolitan statis-
tical area) is defined as any county or group of contiguous counties which 
contains at least one city of 50,000 or more in population, except in New 
England states, where SMSA's are defined in terms of cities and towns 
rather than counties (26). This variable will be used to test the 
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hypothesis that teachers in a state with a more populous environment are 
tll)re likely to experience strike activity than those teachers from less 
populous states. An explanation of this relationship is that a state with 
a large segment of its population located in urbanized areas is likely to 
have a large industrialized base which is typically associated with a 
greater degree of unionization and, hence, strike activity. The data 
source used in the collection of this data was the Current Population Re-
ports, Series P-25 {26). Data for the years 1979 and 1980 were repeated 
from the 1978 measures, since the 1980 census data reported a larger num-
ber of SMSAs than did the earlier reports, and using this recent informa-
tion may lead to a nonuniform set of data. 
a. Percent of female teachers (PCTFEM) Since females have tradi-
tionally been less inclined to participate in union activities, it seems 
reasonable to assume that a basic inverse relationship exists between the 
population of female teachers in a given state and the state's level of 
strike activity (24). Therefore, this variable will be used to measure the 
effect of differing state percentages of female public school teachers on 
the level of strike activity. It is expected that a state with a large 
percentage of female teachers will experience fewer strikes than a state 
with a relatively small percentage of female teachers. Data were avail-
able only for the years 1973, 1975, and 1980, from the Digest of Educational 
Statistics (29). The remaining years were linearly interpolated based on 
the available data. 
c. Nunber of teachers (NTEACH) This varible is used to transform 
the dependent variables and the NEA membership variable to per teacher mea-
sures in order to eliminate the distortions which would be caused when 
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comparing states of differing populations. Without this transformation, 
state comparisons would be meaningless, since a very large state would be 
found to experience more strikes than would a smaller state, regardless of 
frequency rates. An alternative use of this measure is to use it as an ad-
ditional independent variable. Data pertaining to this measure were col-
lected from the Digest of Educational Statistics (29). 
Appendix A contains a listing of additional variables considered to be 
determinants of public school teacher strike activity. These variables 
were eliminated from the model after a preliminary examination revealed 
that they displayed a degree of 1T1Jlticollinearity with variables already 
included in the model or that their inclusion added little, if any, addi-
tional explanatory power to the model. 
C. Model Development 
Table 3-2 sunmarizes the variables used in the following model, speci-
fying the variable notation which was used along with the expected sign of 
the correlation coefficients. An early examination of the pooled residuals 
revealed the possibility of nonlinearity in the PCTSMSA and NONAG measures. 
The residuals were positive in the lower and higher bounds of these mea-
sures and negative in the middle of the grouping. This configuration of 
residuals may indicate that these measures may best be captured by use of 
a quadratic function. Therefore, two additional variables which square 
these measures will be added to the regression. A test of this specifica-
tion will be incorporated in the model results chapter of this paper. 
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Table 3-2. Sunmary of variables used in the rrodel 
Variable name Variable Expected notation sign 
Dependent 1) Nunt>er of stoppages NSTOP N.A. 
variables 2) Number of stoppages 
{per teacher) 
NNSTOP N.A. 
3) Nunber of workers involved NWKIN N.A. 
4) Nunber of workers in- NNWKIN N.A. 
valved (per teacher) 
5) Nunt>er of days idle DUR N.A. 
6) Number of da)s idle 
{per teacher 
NDUR N.A. 
Independent 1) Percentage of nonagricul- NONAG Negative 
variables tural employees unionized 
2) NONAG squared NAG SQ Positive 
3) Right-to-work RTTOWK Negative 
4) NEA ment>ers NEAMEM Positive 
5) NEA ment>ers {per teacher} NNEAMEM Positive 
6) No strike law NOSTRK Negative 
7) Mutual duty to bargain MDU TY Positive or 
negative 
8) Unemployment rate UNEM Positive or 
negative 
9) Two period lagged wage LAG2 Negative 
10) Expenditures per pupil EXP PUP Positive or 
negative 
11) Percent of population in PCT SMSA Negative 
SMSA 
12) PCTSMSA squared SMSA SQ Positive 
13) Percent of female teachers PCTFEM Negative 
14) Nunt>er of public school NT EACH Positive 
teachers 
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The model will be analyzed in two separate formats. A transformed ap-
proach will transform the dependent variables and the NEAMEM into 11 per pub-
1 ic teacher 11 units by dividing each observation by the number of public 
school teachers. An alternative model will employ the actual measures of 
these variables taking account of the number of public school teachers in 
a given state by means of adding an additional independent variable NTEACH. 
This model specification will be referred to as the absolute model. The 
two model s will be specified as follows: 
1. Transformed dependent variable 
NY· · = Bo + 131 NONAG .. + s2 NAGSQ .. + 133 RTTOWK . . + s4 NNEAMEM .. lJ lJ lJ . lJ l J 
+ s5 NDSTRK . . + s6 MDUTY .. + e7 UNEM .. + s8 LAG2 . . lJ lJ lJ lJ 
+ Bg EXPPUPij + s10 PCTSMSAij + s11 SMSASQij 
+ s12 PCTFEMij; 
2. Absolute dependent variable 
where: 
Y iJ. = So + 61 NONAG .. + 62 NAGSO .. + 133 RTIOWK . . + e4 NEAMEM .. lJ "lJ lJ lJ 
+ s5 NOSTRK . . + s6 MDUTY .. + s7 UNEM . . + e8 LAG2 .. lJ lJ lJ lJ 
+ Bg EXPPUPij + 1310 PCTSMSAij + s11 SMSASQij 
+ Sl2 PCTFEMij + s13 NTEACHij; 
NY represents either NNSTOP .. , NNWKIN . . , or NDUR .. ; 
ij lJ lJ lJ 
Y. . represents either NSTOP . . , NWKIN . . , or DUR .. ; 
lJ lJ lJ lJ 
i represents the state or District of Columbia; 
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j represents the year, 1972 through 1980; 
~O represents the intercept. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter will focus on the empirical results obtained from the 
two models specified in the previous chapter. Section A will be used to 
examine the descriptive statistics of the variables considered in the model. 
Section B will discuss the results obtained from the regression analysis. 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
This section will examine the descriptive statistics and identify 
trends regarding the data used in the models specified in the preceding chap-
ter (see Appendix B). An examination of the dependent variable reveals a 
general trend of increased strike activity from 1972 to 1980, but with a de-
cline in strike activity occurring in 1976 and 1977. Examining the dependent 
variables in "per teacher" units of measurement leads to the same conclusion. 
An examination of the individual states reveals that large industrial 
states , such as California, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New 
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, consistently experience the largest fraction 
of the overall level of strike activity. 3 Of all states examined, only Illi-
nois and Michigan exhibit any trend with regard to an increased level of 
strike activity. None of the states examined displayed any indication of 
a decreasing trend in strike activity during the period examined. Most 
states displayed variation in strike activity throughout the period examined. 
Hopefully, the regression analysis will explain some of this variation. 
The percentage of the nonagricultural workforce which is unionized 
(NONAG), has been declining, except for the 1979-80 period which exhibits 
a slight increase. In contrast, the NEAMEM variable used to measure the 
3 Raw data available from author upon request. 
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degree of public teacher unionization increases until 1978, declining 
thereafter. This trend may not be truely indicative of teacher unioniza-
tion, si nce the NEAMEM measure is subject to error and does not include 
members of the rival union, AFT. However, it appears as though unioniza-
tion, in general, has been declining over the period considered, while pub-
lic teacher unionization has been increasing in relative terms . 
Although the majority of legislation concerning public teacher strikes 
was enacted prior to the period examined in this study, it is apparent that 
more states are enacting such legislation. In the year 1972, sixty-five 
percent of the states prohibited strikes by statute. As of 1980, seventy-
five percent of the states had "no strike 11 provisions in effect. On the 
other hand, it appears as though more states are becoming aware of the 
problem of public sector strike activity, as evidenced by the increase in 
the percentage of states enacting mutual duty collective bargaining stat-
utes. 
An examination of the economic factors reveals that LAG2, the vari-
able measuring a two period change in real wages for public school teach-
ers, is negative throughout the period examined. This is a significant 
finding, since it reveals that teacher wages have not kept up with the in-
flation rate for any of the years examined in this study. On the other 
hand, expenditures per pupil (EXPPUP) have exhibited an increasing trend 
in real terms throughout the period. This suggests that, although expen-
ditures for public education have been increasing, the relative share re-
ceived by public teachers has been decl ining . 
The demographic and teaching environment variables have been relative-
ly constant throughout the period of investigation with a slight increase 
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in the population living in SMSAs. The number of public teachers increased 
slightly until 1977, thereafter declining slightly. This may be the result 
of a population decline in school-age children or a result of more students 
attending private schools or a combination of both. The percentage of fe-
male teachers (PCTFEM) has remained fairly constant throughout the period of 
investigation, both in aggregate and for individual states. Before dis-
cussing the regression results, it may be helpful to point out the large 
degree of variation exhibited in the majority of variables considered in 
this study. 
B. Regression Results 
As stated in the previous chapter, the specified model was run using 
two formats. One specification was to transform the dependent variables 
and the NEA members so that they would be measured in "per teacher" units 
of measurement. The other specification was to measure these variables in 
absolute terms, adding an additional independent variable NTEACH to account 
for the differences in each state's number of public school teachers. The 
R-square for the transformed model specification is consistently lower than 
the absolute version. This may be due to the fact that the measurement 
errors in the dependent variables are magnified by dividing these variables 
by NTEACH, which has a measurement error associated with it as well. 
The major focus of this study was to construct a model for the nurrber 
of work stoppages taking place in the public school teacher segment of the 
workforce. An examination of the pooled regression results tends to sup-
port the use of the independent variables selected as determinants of work 
stoppages (see Table 4-1). In fact, with the exception of NEAMEM, NNEAMEM, 
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Table 4-1. Pooled regression results for NSTOP and NNSTOPa,b 
Variable NSTOP name 
Intercept 8.9496 
(1.792)* 
NONAG -0.463r 
(-2.017 ** 
NAG SQ 0.016 
(3.45)*** 
RTTOWK -0.0342 
(-0.042) 
NEAMEM -0.000049 
(-2.179)** 
NNEAMEM N.A. 
NOSTRK -1. 9936 
(-2.941)*** 
MDU TY 0.5836 
(0 .877) 
UNEM 0.0597 
(0 .357) 
LAG2 -0.4241 
(-3.682)*** 
EXP PUP -0.0018 
(-1.31) 
PCTSMSA -0.0283 
(-0 .618) 
SMSASO 0.00043 
( 1.034) 
PCTFEM -0.121 
(-2.464)** 
NETACH 0.000104 
(5.095)*** 
R-SQUARE 0.4191 
at-ratios in parentheses. 
hTwo-tailed t-test. 
NNSTOP 
0.0003 
(2.871)** 
-0.0000046 
(-1.103) 
0.00000015 
(1. 796 )* 
-0 .000033 
(-2.005)** 
N.A. 
-0.000017 
(-0.621) 
-0.000024 
(-1.876 )* 
-0.000023 
(-1.822)* 
0.0000068 
(2.13)** 
-0.0000064 
(-2.914)*** 
-0.00000005 
(-1.803 )* 
-0.0000013 
(-1.461) 
0.00000002 
(2.312)** 
-0.000003 
(-3.134)*** 
N.A. 
0.2077 
*'**'***Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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and MDUTY in the absolute format, all independent variables have the ex-
pected signs in the regressions on the nurrber of stoppages. Although both 
specifications are fairly consistent as to sign, the transformed (NNSTOP) 
specification seems to result in higher significance levels for the inde-
pendent variables than does the absolute (NSTOP) specification. That is, 
the independent variables seem to exhibit greater precision of estimation 
when using the specification which transforms the relevant variables into 
"per teacher" units of measurement. It was thought that the NONAG coeffi-
cient would be negative and the NAGSQ coefficient positive with this con-
figuration leading to a convex quadratic function. All NONAG and NAGSQ co-
efficients displayed these signs in the pooled specification for the num-
ber of stoppages with 3 of 4 being significant. A F-test was performed on 
the slope of the NONAG and NAGSQ measures in addition to testing the sig-
nificance of jointly using these measures in the model (see Appendix C). 
The F-test revealed that the slope and joint inclusion of both NONAG and 
NAGSQ was significant in the absolute (NSTOP) specification only. 
The coefficient on RTTOWK was negative as hypothesized. However, only 
the transformed ~.del was found to be significant. This is probably due to 
the effect of the transformation which accounts for the population differ-
ences, since right-to-work laws are in effect in states with relatively 
small populations. 
A rather puzzling finding was the consistently negative coefficient 
on both the NEAMEM and NNEAMEM measures with the NEAMEM being significant. 
It was thought that NEA menbership was positively related to the nurrber 
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of stoppages, but the findings of this study do not strongly support this 
hypothesis. 4 
The legal variables, NOSTRK and MDUTY, were surprisingly strong de-
terminants of the number of stoppages. The NOSTRK variable was negative 
as hypothesized and significant for both the transformed and absolute mod-
els. The MDUTY variable exhibited mixed results as the coefficient was 
negative and significant in the transformed specification only. Although 
the sign on MDUTY was positive in the absolute model, the significance was 
rather weak and, therefore, the alternative hypothesis that MDUTY leads to 
increase~ strike activity is rather weak and should probably be rejected. 
Prior studies (3) found no significant relationship between the legal de-
terminants and the number of stoppages. This was thought to be a result 
of the laws being recently enacted and not enough time elapsing for the 
workforce to adjust to the changing legal environment (23). 
When considering the economic variables, it was hypothesized that 
UNEM and EXPPUP could have either positive or negative coefficients de-
pending on which of the alternative hypotheses one chooses. The pooled 
coefficients on UNEM are both positive with the transformed specification 
significant. This suggests that higher levels of unemployment seem to be 
associated with ITK>re industrialized areas which typically experience 1TK>re 
work stopoages. The coefficients were negative for the EXPPUP measures, 
4 There were numerous measurement problems associated with the NEA 
measures. In addition, the NEAMEM variable was used as a proxy for public 
school teacher unionization and any membership movement to the rival 
union, AFT, is not accounted for in this study. 
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with the transformed specification being signif icant. This result leads one 
to weakly conclude that states which fund their public school systems at 
higher levels experience fewer work stoppages. The LAG2 variable was nega-
tive and significant, confirming previous studies' results which concluded 
that real wages are major determinants of work stoppages . 
The demographic variables were consistent in sign as was hypothesized. 
The quadratic SMSASQ was significant for the transformed roodel only. The 
slope and joint inclusion F- tests regarding the PCTSMSA and SMSASQ measure 
were not significant (see Appendix C). The remaining demographic variables, 
PCTFEM and NTEACH, displayed the expected sign coefficient and were found 
to be highly significant as determinants of the number of work stoppages. 
The remaining dependent variables regarding the nunber of workers in-
volved and work-days idle will likewise be analyzed in a pooled specifica-
tion. 5 The independent variables used in this model were less successful 
as determinants of the nurtber of workers i nvolved and the nurtber of work-
days idle. The number of workers involved in a work stoppage is a function 
of the size of the work unit involved in the stoppage. Although variables, 
such as PCTSMSA, attempt to differentiate between states with large and 
small urban populations, it does not take into account the stoppages which 
take place in urban versus rural areas. Hence, it is believed that the 
lack of success with regard to the NWKIN and NNWKIN dependent variables is 
due to the large degree of population differences among a given state's 
school districts of which this cross-section has no adequate specification 
to measure. 
5 Yearly regression results are available from the author upon request. 
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The work-days idle (DUR and NDUR) regressions were not as successful 
as were the number of stoppages regressions . This is, in part, due to the 
fact that work-days idle are a function of the number of workers involved. 
As such, any measurement problems present in the number of workers in-
volved measure is magnified when considering the measurement of work-days 
idle . 
Table 4-2 presents the results of the pooled regressions regarding 
NWKIN and NNWKIN. The absolute specification exhibited the hypothesized 
sign coefficients on all of the independent variables. However, only the 
quadratic term (NAGSQ), LAG2, and NTEACH, were significant. The legal 
variables, MDUTY and NOSTRK, were of the hypothesized sign, but were not 
found to be significant. It appears as though these laws have little ef-
fect on the number of workers involved in a work stoppage. 
The transformed model (NNWKIN ) is not as consistent as far as the sign 
coefficients are concerned. In addition, none of the independent variables 
were found to be significant in the transformed specification. The coeffi-
cient on NNEAMEM was negative, which i s again opposite to the hypothesized 
sign . The coefficients on MDUTY and PCTFEM were both positive, which is 
opposite to the hypothesized signs regarding these variables. As was the 
case with the NNSTOP, it appears as though the t ransformation procedure 
whi ch transforms teacher-based variables into "per teacher" measures weak-
ens the model's explanatory power. 
The F-tests measuri ng the significance of the slope and joint inclu-
s ion of the NONAG and NAGSQ, PCTSMSA and SMSASQ terms displayed mixed re-
sults . The F-tests were si gnificant in the absolute specification for the 
47 
Table 4-2. Pooled regression results for NWKIN and NNWKINa,b 
Variable 
name 
Intercept 
NON AG 
NAG SQ 
RTTOWK 
NEAMEM 
NNEAMEM 
NOSTRK 
MDU TY 
UNEM 
LAG2 
EXP PUP 
PCTSMSA 
SMSA SQ 
PCTFEM 
NTEACH 
R-SQUARE 
aT-ratios in parentheses. 
bTwo-tailed T-test. 
NWKIN 
2200.2 
(0.598) 
-197.706 
(-1.169) 
6.6788 
(1.957)* 
-126.728 
(-0.21) 
0.0022 
(0.135) 
N.A. 
-521. 715 
(-1.045) 
-9.367 
(-0.019) 
121. 985 
(0.99) 
-215.66 
(-2.542)** 
-0 .2698 
(-0.268) 
-21.829 
(-0 .647) 
0.2389 
(0.772) 
-44.2172 
(-1.223) 
0.0327 
(2.185)** 
0.2479 
*,**Significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
NNWKIN 
-0 .0185 
(-0.21) 
-0.0014 
(-0.401) 
0.000061 
(0.86) 
-0 .0168 
( -1.195) 
N.A. 
-0.0086 
(-0.362) 
-0.0156 
(-1.406) 
0.0056 
(0.518) 
0.0034 
( 1. 223) 
-0.0018 
(-0.948) 
-0.000012 
(-0.55) 
-0.0003 
(-0.401) 
0.000008 
(1.172) 
0.00046 
(0.535) 
N.A. 
0.0946 
48 
NONAG measures and in the transformed model for the SMSA measures (see Ap-
pendix C). 
Table 4-3 presents results from the pooled model concerning the work-
days idle (DUR and NDUR) dependent measures. Two variables, the NEA mem-
bership and mutual duty (MDUTY) measures were opposite of the hypothesized 
sign in both the absolute and transformed model specification. The qua-
dratic term (NAGSQ) was significant in the absolute specification as was 
the NOSTRK measure. The coefficient on the UNEM variable was negative, 
but not significant. This result is opposite to the coefficient signs on 
UNEM for the other dependent measures. This weakly suggests that the al-
ternative hypothesis may apply in this case. That is, a higher unemploy-
ment rate leads to a reduction in work-days idle. 
The PCTFEM coefficient displayed a positive sign for the NDUR model, 
but had the hypothesized negative sign for the absolute model specifica-
tion. The LAG2 measure was of the hypothesized negative sign and signifi-
cant for both model specifications. In addition, the NTEACH variable was 
positive and significant as a determinant of DUR. 
The F-test regarding the inclusion of both NONAG and NAGSQ was signif-
icant in both the transformed (NDUR) and absolute (DUR) models. The slope 
test was significant for NONAG only in the absolute (DUR) model. The slope 
test and joint inclusion test for the SMSA measures were significant only 
in the transformed (NDUR) specification (see Appendix C). 
The overall results of this model may now be surnnarized. The regres-
sion models employing the absolute specification were, in general, more 
successful than were the transformed models. The model regarding the nunber 
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Table 4-3 . Pooled regression results for DUR and NDURa,b 
Vari ab 1 e 
name 
Intercept 
NONAG 
NAG SQ 
RTIOWK 
NEAMEM 
NNEAMEM 
NOSTRK 
MDU TY 
UNEM 
LAG2 
EXP PUP 
PCTSMSA 
SMSA SQ 
PC TFEM 
NT EACH 
R-SOUARE 
DUR 
34671.87 
(0.815) 
-2407.68 
(-1.231) 
82.2767 
(2.085)** 
-1285.58 
(-0.185) 
-0.0826 
(-0.436) 
N.A. 
-12020.4 
(-2.083)** 
3551.024 
(0.627) 
-370.1508 
(-0.26) 
-2819.91 
(-2.875)*** 
-8 .4265 
(-0. 723) 
40.058 
(0.103) 
0.4478 
(0.125) 
-505.5964 
(-1. 209} 
o.3g44 
(2.277)** 
0.2097 
aT-ratios in parentheses. 
bTwo-tailed t-test. 
NDUR 
-0.1738 
(-0 .166) 
-0.0157 
(-0. 37) 
0.00074 
(0.882) 
-0 .1376 
(-0.826) 
N.A. 
-0.4441 
(-1.57) 
-0 . 1273 
(-0.965) 
0.0883 
(0.683) 
-0 .0022 
(-0.066) 
-0.0373 
(-1.654)* 
-0.000024 
(-0.091) 
-0.0054 
(-0.604) 
0.0001 
( 1. 229) 
0 .0077 
(0.755} 
N.A. 
0.0789 
*'**,***Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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of stoppages was fairly successful as the ma j ority of the independent vari-
ables had the hypothesized sign, many of which were significant. The mod-
els relating to the number of 'NOrkers involved and work-days idle were not 
as successful. This is probably a result of the large degree of in-state 
variation which is present in many of the variables used in this study. 
The next chapter will present t'NO alternative models which, hopefully, 
will provide further insight regarding public school teacher strike ac -
tivity. 
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V. ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
This chapter will be used to fortTX.Jlate and present two alternative 
rrodels regarding public school teacher strike activity. Section A will 
present a model which incorporates the individual states as additional 
du1T1T1y variables to further account for the variation of strike activity. 
Section B will examine the possibility of a simultaneous equation bias and 
develop a two-stage least squares model which addresses this possibility. 
A. State Durrrny Model 
The previous model results indicated that a large degree of variation 
in strike activity was not accounted for. Although the independent vari-
ables specified were fairly successful as determinants of strike activity, 
there remains a degree of variability that cannot be captured by the spec-
ified de:erminants. That i>, the specified determinants used cannot com-
pletely control for differences, such as teacher militancy, tastes toward 
unionization or strike activity, and the industrial or occupation mix of 
workers in a given state. Therefore, it is thought that, by including in-
dividual state durrmy variables as additional determinants, some of the 
variability that was not accounted for in the initial model may be cap-
tured by the individual "state effects." 
The basic model used in the previous chapter was modified by includ-
ing a durrmy variable for each state and the District of Colunbia. One 
state must be omitted as a dulTIT\Y variable to prevent the model from becom-
ing singular. The state chosen for omission was Alaska. Alaska was 
omitted since it was unique in its legal environment when compared to the 
remaining states. The state of Alaska is the only state with no laws 
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regarding public strikes and no right-to-work legislation. When the state 
dUfTIT\Y variables are included, the model can only be examined in a pooled 
specification because there are not sufficient degrees of freedom when 
using only yearly observations. 
The regressions including the state du11111Y variables were run using 
both the transformed and absolute model specification for all three depen -
dent variables in a pooled analysis (see Table 5-1). As was the case with 
the previous model, the NSTOP and NNSTOP dependent variables exhi bited the 
best results and will, therefore, be the major focus of the discussion which 
follows . 
The coefficients on the NAGSQ, SMSASQ, NEA measures, PCTFEM, and 
NTEACH change sign when adding the state durrmy variables to the nunber of 
stoppages model. This may be a result of the state dummies capturing the 
population differences among the states that these variables were original-
ly designed to capture. A more puzzling result is the NOSTRK coefficient 
which changes sign becoming positive and significant. This may be due to 
a mis-specification concerning the NOSTRK determinant. That is, there may 
be a simultaneous equation bias associated with the NOSTRK variable. This 
poss ibility will be examined later in the chapter. 
The F- test performed to test for the joint inclusion of NONAG and 
NAGSQ, as wel l as PCTSMSA and SMSASQ, displayed no significance in any of 
the regressions performed. An additional F-test on the slopes of the 
NONAG and SMSA measures was also found to be insignificant (see Appendix 
D). 
Of the 100 state dummies used in both the transformed and absolute 
model specifications regarding the number of stoppages, 68 had negati ve 
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coefficients of which 34 were significant. Of the 32 cases in which the 
coefficient was positive, 7 of these were si gnificant . Only two states, 
Michigan and Pennsylvania, were significant and positive with regard to 
both NSTOP and NNSTOP. The states which displayed a significantly negative 
coefficient in both the transformed and absolute model specifications were: 
Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexi-
co, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia . 
Of the 100 state dummies used in both the t ransformed and absolute 
specifications regarding the number of workers involved, 96 had negative 
coefficients of which 52 were significant. Of the 4 cases in which the co-
efficients were positive, none were significant. The states displaying a 
significantly negative coefficient in both the transformed and absolute 
specifications were : Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Caorlina, Vir-
ginia, and West Virginia. 
The work-days idle regressions (NDUR and DUR) were not as successful 
when using the state dummy variables. Of 100 cases, 93 had negative coef-
ficients, of which 28 were significant. However, none of the states were 
significant in either a negative or positive correlation across both the 
transformed and absolute model specifications . 
There were 28 states which were consistently negative in sign across 
all 6 dependent variables. Of these 28 states, none were found to be sig-
nificant across all dependent variables used in this study. No states 
were found to display a consistently positive sign coefficient across all 
dependent measures. 
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The rationale for the inclusion of the state dulTVT\Y variables was to 
determine if there were any "state effects" which were not adequately cap-
tured by the original model. A F-test performed to determine the signifi-
cance of the inclusion of the 50 state du11111Y variables displayed signifi-
cance for the inclusion of the state du1T111ies for the NSTOP and NNSTOP re-
gression models. 6 
The explanatory power of the model seemed to improve across all depen-
dent measures when the state dunrny variables were added. However, when ex-
amining the significant state du11111Y variables with regard to the nunber of 
stoppages, no clear reason is apparent for their significance. A positive 
coefficient was displayed for both Michigan and Pennsylvania, both of which 
have large populations and strong union movements. However, states such as 
Ohio and Illinois also have strong union movements and were not found to 
be consistently significant. The states which display a consistently nega-
tive and significant coefficient are equally puzzling. About the only com-
mon thread among them is that they all have a relatively small population. 
However, states such as Wyoming also have small populations and are not 
statistically significant . In conclusion, one can only state that these 
significant state dunmy variables are capturing some determinant of the 
number of stoppages which were not adequately captured by the original in -
dependent variables. 
6A F-test was not performed regarding the significance of the state 
durrmy variables in the NWKIN, NNWKIN, DUR, and NDUR regressions. 
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B. Simultaneous Equation Model 
As wa s stated earlier, the sign change on the NOSTRK measure when re-
gressed against the nunt>er of stoppages (NSTOP and NNSTOP) may be an indi-
cation of a simultaneous equation bias. This section will be used to form-
ulate an alternative two-stage least squares (TSLS) model which will ex-
amine the possibility of a simultaneous equation bias. 
The basic question to be addressed is: does the existence of a "no 
strike" law lead to a reduction in the number of stoppages or does a large 
number of stoppages lead to the passage of a no strike law? A reduced mod-
el using two-stage least squares was specified in an attempt to answer this 
question . An additional independent variable, 11 DMSOUTH, 11 was added to the 
model as a dulTlll\Y variable. This variable will be used to identify states 
defined by the Bureau of the Census (26) as being southern as a regional 
specification. This DMSOUTH variable was added to the model as a deter-
minant of no strike legislation (15). 
The following two-stage least squares (TSLS) model was specified as 
follows: 
-"'-NOSTRK .. = e0 + a1NSTOP . . + e2NONAG .. + s3NAGSQ .. lJ lJ lJ lJ 
----N STOP. · = s0 + B 1NOSTRK . . + s2N EAMEM. . + s3LAG2 . . + s4UN EM .. lJ lJ lJ 1J lJ 
+ s5PCTFEM .. + s6NTEACH . . lJ lJ 
56 
+ r BkDUMSTATE.k; 
k=7 J 
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where: 
Bo represents the intercept; 
i represents the state or District of Columbia; 
j represents the year; 
k represents the 50 state and district duntT\Y variables. 
Note: The transformed specification of the above model eliminates the 
NTEACH variable and uses NNSTOP and NNEAMEM measures in place of 
the NSTOP and NEAMEM variables. 
Since the TSLS model was specified using a reduced set of independent 
variables, a reduced model must also be specified using ordinary least 
squares (01.S). This reduced OLS model is necessary in order to compare the 
results to determine if there is evidence of a simultaneous equation bias 
in the NOSTRK measure. The reduced form OLS model was specified as fol-
lows: 
NSTOP .. = B0 + B1NOSTRK . . + B2NEAMEM .. + B3LAG2 .. + B4UNEM .. lJ lJ lJ lJ lJ 
+ BsPCTFEM .. + a6NONAG .. + B7NAGSQ .. + BaRTTOWK .. lJ lJ lJ lJ 
6 0 
+ r BkDUMSTATE.k 
k=ll J 
where: 
B
0 
represents the intercept; 
i represents the state or District of Columbia; 
~ represents the year; 
k represents the 50 state and district duntT\Y variables. 
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Note: The transformed model specification omits NTEACH and uses NNSTOP and 
NNEAMEM instead of NSTOP and NEAMEM. 
The results of both the OLS and TSLS regressions are presented in Ta-
ble 5-2. The OLS coefficient on the variable NOSTRK is positive and sig-
nificant when using the fifty state dumnw variables in the regression for 
the number of stoppages. When the model is specified without the state 
durrmy variables, the NOSTRK coefficient is negative and significant which 
is consistent with the hypothesis. When using the same variables in the 
TSLS model, the only siqn change takino place was the NOSTRK coefficient 
which hecame negative in the transformed (NNSTOP) model specification. 
The NOSTRK coefficient remained positive in the absolute (NSTOP) model al -
thouqh the coefficient significance is drastically reduced. This finding 
tends to su~port the presence of a simultaneous equation bias with respect 
to the variable NOSTRK. 
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Table 5-2. OLS vs. TSLS: Pooled data with state durruny variablesa,b,c 
Variable OLS TSLS OLS TSLS 
name NSTOP NS TOP NNSTOP NNSTOP 
Intercept -10 . 5661 -13.2529 -0.00004 -0.00007 
(-1.174) (-1. 707}* (-0.158) (-0.346) 
NOSTRK 2.8182 1.086 0.00005 -0.00005 
(2. 698 )*** (0.152) (1.973)** (-0 .24) 
NEAMEM 0.00002 0.00004 N.A. N.A. 
(0.389) (0 .681) 
NNEAMEM N.A. N.A. 0.00004 0.00007 
(0.641) (0.917) 
UNEM 0.1148 0.1806 0.000005 0.000005 
(0.734) (0.643) (1.509) (0.604) 
PCTFEM 0.1423 0.1526 0.0000003 0.0000007 
( 1.428) (J..522) (0.145) (0.281) 
NONAG 0.0911 N.A. 0.0000002 N.A. 
(0.199) (0.022) 
NAG SQ -0.0041 N.A. -0 .00000004 N.A. 
(-0 .478) (-0.192) 
RTTOWK -0.2537 N.A. 0.0000005 N.A. 
(-0.09) (0.008) 
DMSOUTH N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
NTEACH -0.00008 -0.00006 N.A. N.A . 
(-1.169) (-0.94) 
R-SQUARE 0.7355 0.73 0.4675 0.4429 
aT-ratios in parentheses. 
bTwo-tailed t-test. 
cCoefficients and t-ratios regarding the individual 
variables are available from the author upon request. 
state durrmy 
*•**•***Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respecti vely. 
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VI. SUMMARY, QUALIFICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Sunmary 
Chapter I of this thesis presented a brief description of the growing 
problem of public school teacher strike activity. The chapter included a 
discussion of possible reasons why this segment of the workforce experi-
ences more strike activity than any other public sector employee group. 
Chapter 2 examined the theory of strikes in general, with special em-
phasis given to Hicks' (8) theory of "faulty negotiation" and an expanded 
theoretical version proposed by Ashenfelter and Johnson (1). 
Previous empirical studies concerning the determinants of strike ac-
tivity, both in general and specifically related to the public sector, were 
examined . The general consensus of opinion regarding strike activity was 
that economic factors, such as the unemployment rate, the rate of infla-
tion, and, in particular, the worker's real wages, were found to be most 
significant as determinants of strike activity. Other reasons cited for 
strike activity were the degree of unionization and occupational mix of 
the workforce. The individual state's legal environment was also examined 
in many of the previous studies. However, the results concerning legal de -
terminants and their effect on strike activity, both in general and public 
sector employment groups, were found to be inconsistent and, therefore, 
not of much use in providing information for future public legislation. 
Chapter 3 was used to develop a model of strike activity specifically 
focusing upon the public school teacher segment of the workforce. As most 
of the previous investigations concerning public sector strike activity 
were completed during the early 1970s, a later period of examination was 
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chosen for the time frame of this study. The majority of the legal stat-
utes regarding public sector strike activity were enacted during the late 
1960s to early 1970s, a period which corresponds to the majority of re-
search concerning public sector strike activity. Therefore, a major focus 
of this study was to examine whether these previously enacted legal stat-
utes had the effect that they were desired to have -- namely, to decrease 
the amount of public sector strike activity. 
This study did not limit the examination of strike activity to only 
legal or economic variables as determinants. The nature of today's work-
force is too complex to capture the determination of strike activity by 
only considering a few variables. Therefore, this study incorporated a 
broad spectrum of determinants. Factors thought to influence public teach-
er strike activity were broadly categorized by the following groups: 
unionization, economic and legal environments, de1TX>graphic characteristics, 
and teacher specific working environments. On the basis of economic theo-
ry and results from previous studies, a regression model was developed re-
garding public school teacher strike activity. An OLS model was developed 
to examine the number of stoppages, the number of workers involved, and the 
number of work-days idle caused by the stoppage. 
The results of the basic OLS model were presented in Chapter 4. Two 
alternative models were analyzed: a transformed model which transforms 
the dependent variables and NEA members into "per public teacher" units 
and an absolute model which accounted for teacher population differences 
by adding an additional independent variable, NTEACH. 
The regressions on the number of stoppages exhibited the best results. 
With the exception of the NEA membership variables and MDUTY in the 
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absolute specification, all other independent variables displayed the 
hypothesized sign. The quadratic term (NAGSQ), NOSTRK, LAG2, and PCTFEM 
were significant in both the transformed and absolute model specifications. 
The regressions regarding the other dependent variables NWKIN, NNWKIN, 
DUR, and NOUR were not as successful. Fewer independent variables were 
consistent in sign across both the transformed and absolute model specifica-
tions . In fact, none of the independent measures were consistently signif-
icant in the regressions on the number of workers involved and only LAG2 
was consistently significant when regressed on work-days idle. The absolute 
model specification displayed the best results as NAGSQ , LAG2, and NTEACH 
were found to be consistently significant across all three dependent mea -
sures. The transformed model spec ification displayed no consistent signifi -
cance across the three dependent measures analyzed. 
Although the variables selected as determinants of the nun'ber of stop-
pages were fairly successful, there remained a fairly large degree of vari-
ability not accounted for by the proposed model. Chapter 5 presented two 
alternative models. A state dumrrtY model was forlll.Jlated to include a state 
dummy variable for each state with the exception of Alaska. This procedure 
was used so that some of the variability not accounted for might be cap-
t ured by the individual state effects. Results of this model tend to con-
firm that these state effects thought to capture the variability in tastes, 
militancy, and occupational mix not captured by the previously defined 
model were significant. 
When adding the state dulllllY variables to the model, several coeffi-
cients changed sign. The MDUTY measure is consistently negative in sign 
across all dependent measures as was hypothesized, when using the state 
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dull1fT\Y model. Many of the sign changes on the SMSA measures, PCTFEM, and 
NTEACH could be attributed to the individual state effects which captured 
some of the effect these variables were originally designed to capture. 
One variable which displayed a drastic sign change and was not thought to 
be a function of the individual state effects was the NOSTRK measure which 
changed both sign and significance when regressed against NSTOP and NNSTOP. 
The sign change on NOSTRK was thought to be an indication of a simul-
taneous equation bias concerning this measure . That is, it may be that 
states which experience a large number of strikes enact a no strike law 
rather than a no strike law reducing the number of strikes. An alternative 
model was formulated using a TSLS procedure. When the simultaneous equa-
tion bias was taken into account the sign on the transformed NOSTRK measure 
changed. The sign on the absolute NOSTRK measure remained positive, al-
though the significance was drastically reduced. These changes regarding 
the NOSTRK measure may be taken as an indication of the presence of a 
simultaneous equation bias. 
B. Qualifications 
Unfortunately, because of data collection problems, this study is 
limited to a nine-year period. This relatively short period of investiga-
tion limits examining the cyclica l variation involving the economic vari-
ables. In addition, any trend activity among the variables used in this 
study is limited because of the relatively short period of examination. 
A longer time series would have been desirable in order to better capture 
the cyclical variation in the data and to identify any possible trend ac-
tivity, especially with regard to the growth of public sector unionization. 
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Care must be exercised when interpreting the results of this study 
si nce problems were experienced in developing a full data set for the peri-
od examined. Many of the data sources used did not contain a complete set 
covering the years of this study which resulted in interpolation for the 
missing data. The actual data for these missing years are not known; how-
ever, it seems unlikely that the missing data are perfectly linearly re-
lated to the data used as an estimate . The NONAG measure was only avail-
able for even years. The measure for PCTFEM, a variable that displayed a 
high degree of success in the models examined, was based on data for three 
years, with the remaining six years being linearly interpolated. The 
EXPPUP and LAG2 measures were not available for 1980, so that this year was 
linearly extrapolated based on prior data. 
A more serious data problem involves the SMSA measure. The nurrt>er of 
SMSAs changed throughout the period. The SMSA measure used was based on 
the percentage of a state's population residing in SMSAs. Some states ex-
amined showed m.Jch variability in this percentage, even though the basic 
population characteristics of the state did not change. That is, a county 
with a population of 49,990 is not considered a SMSA, but once that same 
county reaches a population of 50,000 it is defined as a SMSA. For largely 
populated states, this makes little difference, but for states with small 
populations, this fact may significantly affect the accuracy of this mea-
surement. The number of SMSAs changed from 281 in 1978 to 318 in 1979. 
Rather than bias results based on using the true data, it was decided to 
repeat the 1978 measures for the years 1979 and 1980 in order to obtain a 
more consistent data set . 
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The NEAMEM variable used as a proxy for public teacher union member-
ship is also subject to error. A state which experiences a decline in NEA 
membership may actually be experiencing an increase in teacher union mem-
bership if the rival AFT is gaining members in that state. Unfortunately, 
AFT membership data is not available on a state-by-state basis. This lack 
of data concerning AFT membership also meant that no measure of interunion 
rivalry could be developed for this model. An additional problem with 
the NEA measure is the unification of local NEA organizations which took 
place in the early 1970s. Although an attempt was made to remove any bias 
caused during the change in reporting membership data, one cannot be sure 
of the true membership measures prior to unification. 
A problem with many of the independent variables used in this study 
is with the specification of the data itself. Measures, such as UNEM, 
NONAG, LAG2, EXPPUP, and PCTFEM, are based on a given state's average. 
There may be a large degree of state variation with these measures leading 
to faulty correl ation estimates. An improved measurement could be obtained 
by using school district data or by further segmenting the state average 
measures mentioned above. 
A major theoretical cause of strike activity is the timing of contract 
expirations. Unfortunately, no measure of the number of contract expira-
tions involving public school teachers in a given state is available. It 
i s thought that the inclusion of this measure would much improve the re-
sults of this study . 
Although the NOSTRK variable was found to exhibit a simultaneous equa-
tion bias, no other variables were tested for this possibility. William 
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Moore {15) found evidence of a simultaneous equation bias present in his 
study with respect to the RTTOWK measure. This possibility is present in 
this study as well, but is not formally tested. 
C. Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to determine the causes of teacher 
strikes in the public sector. Since public school teachers strike with 
more frequency than any other group of public employees, it was thought 
that a successful analysis of this group would also shed light on other 
public sector strikes as well. 
Of the three dependent measures of strike activity examined, the study 
was most successful in accounting for the number of stoppages . The inde-
pendent variables seemed to perform best when analyzed in a pooled format 
which captures the long-run effect of these determinants. The NSTOP pooled 
format with the state durrrny variables included accounted for approximately 
74 percent of the variability in the number of stoppages in this study. 
Considering the large degree of variation involved with the measures used 
in this cross-section, this result is surprising. 
One of the most successful independent measures used in the model was 
the LAG2 variable. The LAG2 measure was based upon a weighted two-period 
change in real wages developed by Ashenfelter and Johnson (1). All sixteen 
regressions exhibited the hypothesized negative coefficient with thirteen 
of these being significant. The reader may recall that the mean of the 
LAG2 measure was negative for each year examined in this study . This re-
sult strongly implies that a decrease in real wages increases the level of 
public teacher strike activity. 
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Another variable displaying good results across the sixteen regres-
sions performed was the quadratic term NAGSQ, as seven of these cases were 
significant. The NTEACH variable used to account for differing state 
teacher populations in the absolute model specification also displayed good 
results. Of the eight cases in which thi·s variable was used, five were sig-
nificant. Thi s result tends to support the hypothesis that, as the popu-
lation of public teachers in a given state increases, so does the level of 
public teacher strike activity. 
Of special interest is the performance of the legal variables when re-
gressed on the number of stoppages. Both MDUTY and NOSTRK are negative 
and significant when analyzed in the transformed format . The coefficient on 
NOSTRK remains negative and s ignificant when analyzed in the absolute spec-
ification, but the sign on MDUTY changes to positive and insignificant. It 
would appear as though the enactment of a no strike law has the desired ef-
fect of decreasing the number of stoppages involving public school teach-
ers. Although the MDUTY measure was not as successful as the NOSTRK vari-
able, it appears as though the performance of this NOSTRK measure has im-
proved from the lengthened time frame of study. The reader may recall that 
the oerformance of the legal determinants performed poorly in earlier 
studies. Those were undertaken soon after the passage of the majority of 
state laws concerning public employee bargaining rights. The more recent 
period of analysis in the present investigation may have been able to cap-
ture a more stable period. However, this study is limited to a relatively 
small segment of the total public sector workforce and caution should be 
exercised before making any broad policy implications based on the success 
of this limited study. 
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Possible imorovement in this study may be to include a measure of 
teacher wages in relation to other "professional" employees . An additional 
consideration would be to relate the level of strike activity in other 
groups of public employees to strike activity involving public school 
teachers. These considerations may improve measures pertaining to economic 
and unionization measures. However, it seems unlikely that further specif-
ication of this model will result in vastly improved results, unless the 
in-state variability in both the dependent and independent measures used 
in this study can be better controlled. 
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IX. APPENDIX A: OMITTED VARIABLES 
Omitted variable Reason for omission 
1) Yearly percentage change in Correlated with number of NEA members 
NEA ment>ership 
2) No strike law with penalty Correlated with no strike law 
3) Income per capita 
4) Student-teacher ratio 
5) Nunt>er of school districts 
Correlated with expenditures per 
pupil 
Preliminary analysis showed little 
or no effect 
Preliminary analysis showed little 
or no effect 
NOTE: Additional information concerning these omitted variables is avail-
able from the author upon request. 
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XI. APPENDIX C: 
F-TESTS: MODEL WITHOUT STATE DUMMY VARIABLES 
Table 11-1. F-tests: Model without state dUITIT\Y variablesa,b 
F-test 
Dependent Slopea NONAG=O Slopeb 
variab 1 e NONAG and NAGSQ=O PCTSMSA and 
NAGSQ SMSA SQ 
NSTOP 19.7479 26.0626 2 .1072 
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.1473) 
NNSTOP 2.1609 1.1992 1.3646 
(0.1424) {0.3025) (0.2434) 
NWKIN 5.8356 7.9817 0.3171 
(0.0161)** (0.0004)*** {0.5736) 
NNWKIN 1. 9461 2.281 7.5886 
(0.1637) (0 .1034) ( 0 • 0061 ) *** 
DUR 6.9438 9 .3111 0.4564 
(0 .0087)*** (0.0001)*** (0 .4997) 
NDUR 2.5464 2.783 5.3223 
(0.1113) (0.0629)* (0.0215)** 
aSlope test - Slope = a dependent variable a NONAG 
= NONAG + 2*(MEAN NONAG)*NAGSQ. 
bslope test Slope = a dependent variable 
- a PCTSMSA 
= PCTSMSA + 2*(MEAN PCTSMSA)*SMSASQ; 
Null hypothesis is: Slope = 0. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
PCTSMSA=O 
SMSASQ=O 
1.1616 
(0.3139) 
0.6842 
(0.5051) 
0.3324 
(0.7174) 
3.7958 
{0.0232)** 
0.2437 
(0.7838) 
2.711 
(0.0676)* 
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XII. APPENDIX D: F-TESTS: MODEL WITH 
STATE DUMMY VARIABLES 
Table 12-1. F-tests: Model with state dulTITtY variablesa,b 
F-test 
Dependent Slopea NONAG=O Slopeb variable NONAG and NAGSQ=O PCTSMSA and 
NAG SQ SMSA SQ 
NSTOP J..2809 o. 9725 ?..5512 
(0.2584) (0.379) (0.111) 
NNSTOP 2.1609 1.1992 1.3646 
(0 .1424) (0 .3025) (0 .2434) 
NWKIN 0.1125 0.2068 0.2626 
(0.7375) (0.8132) (0.6086) 
NNWKIN 1.8696 1.6383 0.006 
(0.1723) (0.1956) (0.9813) 
DUR 0.2730 0.2827 0.1351 
(0.6016) (0.7539) (0.7134) 
NDUR 0.3757 0.3823 0 .1001 
(0.5403) (0.6826) (0.7519) 
aSlope test _ Slope = a dependent variable 
a NONAG 
= NONAG+2*(MEAN NONAG)*NAGSQ. 
Null hypothesis is : Slope = O. 
bSlope test _ Slope = a dependent variable 
a NONAG 
= PCTSMSA+2*(MEAN PCTSMSQ)*SMSASQ. 
Null hypothesis is: Slope = 0. 
PCTSMSA=O 
SMSASQ=O 
1.3379 
(0 .2636) 
0.6842 
(0.5051) 
0.1331 
(0.8754) 
0.003 
(0.997) 
0.068 
(0.9343 
0.0537 
(0.9477) 
